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Marini v. Ireland (1970) 
Protecting Low-Income Renters 
by Judicial Shock Therapy 
RICHARD H. CHUSED 
Within a thirty-four-day period in 1970, courts in Illinois, Was~ington, D.C., 
and New Jersey announced decisions that dramatically altered a central aspect 
of landlord-tenant law-the ability of landlords to summ~rily dispossess tenants 
for failure to pay rent. Each decision reached essentially the same conclusion: 
tenants were entitled to defend against summary dispossession if conditions 
in their residences endangered health an,d safety or if there were other unfair 
conditions imposed on their tenancies. These decisions opened the floodgates 
of change. Other reformist court decisions or legislative enactments followed 
in almost every state. The stories of the Illinois and D.C. decisions'. Rosewood v. 
Fisher and]avins v. First National Realty, Corp., have been told elsewhere in great 
detail,1 and most first-year law students around the nation read Javins in their 
property law courses. But, surprisingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision 
in Marini v. Ireland has received much less attention. 2 Placing that decision more 
solidly on the historical record is long overdue. 
The importance of a major case is difficult to measure without knowing 
something about the social, cultural, and historical background of the dispute. 
Marini arose out of the maelstrom that was New Jersey in the 1960s. When I 
arrived at Rutgers University School of Law in Newark during the summer of 
1968 to begin my teaching career, Newark was in chaos. The Reverend Martin 
Luther King Jr. had been assassinated on April 4. From July 12 to July 17 the sum-
mer before, rioting had left the core of the city in shambles. Whites had already 
left the city in large numbers to move to the suburbs, and the flight ~ccelerated 
after 1967. Within a few years of my arrival, many of the main businesses in 
the downtown core downsized or closed, leaving empty building hulks behind. 
Driving up Springfield Avenue-the main 1967 riot corridor-was to go through 
a depressing stretch of poverty, gutted buildings, empty lots, and littered streets. 
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Crime rates skyrocketed. The city, in short, was a wreck-the butt end of tragic 
jokes on television and devastating commentaries in the media. It routinely was 
placed on lists of the worst cities in America. 3 
Camden, Newark's sister city in distress to the south and the site of the 
building that gave rise to Marini, also was in terrible condition. Riots sparkec:1:, 
by the police beating and death of a Puerto Rican motorist erupted in August 
1971, not quite a year after Marini was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
Major industrial facilities, including large plants run by RCA and the New York 
Shipbuilding Corporation, downsized or closed during the 196os.4 Between 1950 
and 1970 the town's population declined by about 17 percent, and by an equal 
amount from 1970 to 1980. 5 
The alarming situations in Newark, Camden, and other inner-city areas of 
the nation's most densely populated state had a palpable impact on the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's desire to bring landlord-tenant disputes before it and 
on its overtly reformist resolution of the legal issues. Just as the relationships 
among poverty, politics, urban disturbances, and the law in Washington, D.C., 
profoundly influenced the decision inJavins, so too the desperate situations in 
Newark and other cities deeply affected judicial developments in New Jersey.6 
In this chapter, I reconstruct some of that history-presenting a portrait 
of the times and describing some of the reasons the courts responded aggres-
sively to the problems they perceived. To do that, I will tal<.e a four-stage jour-
ney. First, I will provide a few intimate, personal stories to bring to life how 
desperately bad the situation in Newark, and by implication other New Jersey 
cities, was in the late 1960s. Second, I will present a portrait of how the New 
Jersey Supreme Court responded to the crisis. That will entail a trek through 
landlord-tenant law as it was prior to the decision in Marini, as well as a look at 
the court's decision in Reste Realty v. Cooper7-a crucial opening gambit in the 
reforms Marini instituted a year later. That tour should make it easier to under-
stand why, as a matter of traditional legal logic, the Reste and Marini opinions 
were partly untenable, if not incoherent. The extraordinary nature of the opin-
ions symbolized the level of desperation felt by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
and the compell:ing pow r of d em a nds among urban re idents for h ange in 
the operation of the state's landlord-tenant courts. The court must have con-
cluded that eviction law needed some shock therapy. Third, I do not want to 
leave the impression that New Jersey's high court behaved much differently or 
more irrationally than courts in other states. A very brief description of events 
elsewhere will make that clear. Finally, you might be curious about whether 
all the ~oopla actually accomplished very much. I will end with a few brief 
thoughts on that issue. 
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Setting the Stage 
The atmosphere at Rutgers Law School when I arrived in 1968 to join the fac-
ulty was tense and frenetic. You could cut the anxiety with a knife. After the 
riot in 1967 and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968, the school 
was the site of negotiations among representatives of the city, county, and state 
governments with members of Newark's black community over what various 
government entities, including the law school, should do. Those discussions 
led to a deciston by Willard Heckel, then dean of the law school and a remark-
able human being, and others in the law school community to seek approval 
from the faculty to establish three clinics-the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, 
the Administrative Process Project (a law school-run bureau in the state attor-
ney general's office to create new methods to enforce fair housing laws), and 
the Urban Legal Clinic-in that order at the rate of one a year. 8 At my first fac-
ulty meeting, the vote was taken and, not without controversy, the clinics were 
approved. The Constitutional Litigation Clinic was established immediat.ely 
and the other two followed. I was quickly thrust into discourse about the depth 
of need in the Newark community for law reform and action, a a.iscourse that 
deeply affects the structure of legal education in New Jersey to this day. 
Other events were even more telling. Two stand out, both related to control 
of the government of Newark by a corrupt, deeply racist white power structure. 
Shortly after my arrival in Newark, lawyers and law teachers were asked to par-
ticipate in a court-watching project at the city's municipal court. Stories about 
mistreatment of black citizens by the court were legion. Various community 
groups, as well as the local chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the National Lawyers Guild, wanted to document them. Lawyers were sought out 
for the court-watching task to reduce the likelihood that court personnel would 
push the visitors around. 
Down Broad Street I went with my yellow pad and pencil. I arrived early 
and sat near the back-the only white person _in the public seating area. White 
court personnel-bailiff, clerks, and others-milled around at the front. The mood 
got ugly as those having business before the court began to arrive. The white court 
personnel, spealdng quite loudly to ensure that those in the black audience heard 
their remarks, began spouting verbal harangues about niggers, welfare queens, 
absent fathers, and criminals. My jaw dropped in amazement. My yellow pad 
began to fill up. 
After a few minutes of this, one of the court officials came over and asked 
me in a less than kindly manner what I was doing there. For the first time in 
my life, I pulled rank, saying I had just arrived in town to tal<.e a job teaching at 
Rutgers Law School and commenting that I wanted to see how things worked in 
the city. He coolly stared at me for a moment and left me alone. But even after 
the court personnel knew who I was, their nasty verbal assaults continued. They 
must have thought their power was unchallengeable. 
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The judge's attitude toward the litigants was not much better. Although he 
did not use any overtly nasty language, his demeanor could be characterized at 
best as curt. Anger among the court's clients was clearly visible in their body 
language, tone of voice, and demeanor. The experience made clear to me more 
than anything else could why the city had exploded in violence the year before. 
Two years later much of the black political community
1 
supported Ken-
neth Gibson's campaign to become the first black mayor of the city. White 
out-migration and black in-migration over the previous twenty years had 
increased the possibility that a black candidate could win the seat. On Elec-
tion Day in 1970, law faculty and students were asked by the Gibson ,campaign 
to serve as poll watchers. A group was assigned to a spot in the all-white North 
Ward. They were not greeted with open arms at the polling place. A law stu-
dent and I were asked to pick them up when their shift was over. We went to 
the polling place to meet the team and wall<.ed as a group back to the car. A 
group of thugs chased us. We got away by the skin of our teeth-scrambling 
into a Volkswagen Beetle as our pursuers bent the hinges of one door out of 
shape just as we sped away. The drive back to the law school was frenetic as we 
raced down the streets with one door unable to be fully closed. Our testimony 
at an emergency chancery court hearing a short time later led to the impound-
ment of the ballot boxes. Newark, like other cities in the state with deeply felt 
racial tensions, was a very nasty place. Although Gibson won the election, the 
campaign's rough edges left an indelible impression on those living in both 
Newark and the rest of New Jersey. 
Such personal anecdotes only touch the surface of Newark's troubles in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rapidity and depth of the city's decline were 
remarkable. Between 1950 and 1970, the population of the city fell by 13 percent. 
But that single data point hides an incredible flow of humanity into and out of 
Newark. In that same twenty years, the city was transformed from a majority-
white to a majority-black metropolis-the white population of Newark declined 
54 percent, while the nonwhite population increased by 183 percent.9 
Such dramatic shifts were accompanied by wholesale disruptions in the 
fabric of urban life, striking changes in commuting patterns and job locations, 
and a significant drop in the number of middle-class residents and resident 
property owners. As middle-class whites left, they were not replaced by either a 
similar number of people or a population as financially capable of buying prop-
erty, maintaining businesses, and reconstructing a framework of social and eco-
nomic life designed for the needs of the new residents. The transition was made 
more difficult by the unwillingness of many majority-white financial and other 
institutions to provide assistance or support to the incoming urban dwellers. 
Social service organizations, nonprofit support groups, religious institutions, 
and other establishments closed and often were not replaced. 
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TABLE 2.1. 
Changing Demographics of Newark 
Year Newark White % % decline Nonwhite 
total population population in white population 
population white population 
1950 438,776 363,149 82.8 75,627 
1960 405,220 265,889 65.6 26.8 139,331 
1970 382,417 168,382 44.0 36.7 214,035 
1980 329,248 101,417 30.8 39.8 227,831 
1990 275,221 78,771 28.6 22.3 196,450 
2000 273,546 72,490 26.5 8.0 201,056 
Source: U.S. Census data, 1950-2000. 
As George Sternlieb summarized the situation in his classic study, the 
decline in Newark's housing stock was due in significant part to the decline of 
resident ownership of leasehold property: 
[T]here is no question of the significance of landlord residence, particu-
larly single-parcel landlords, as insurance. of property maintenance of 
slum tenements. Given the priority accorded by multiple-parcel owners 
to tenant problems as an inhibitor [to upkeep] .. . the lack of feeling 
on this score by resident landlords, coupled with their good record in 
maintenance, is most significant. It is the resident landlord, and only the 
resident landlord, who is in a position to properly screen and supervise 
his tenantry. No one-shot wave of maintenance and paint up-sweep up 
campaign can provide the day-to-day maintenance which is required in 
slum areas. Given the relatively small size of Newark !enement units, and 
others like them, this can only be accomplished by a resident landlord. 
The record of these landlords .. . i_s such as to inspire confidence in their 
future behavior on this score.10 
The vast scope of problems confronting urban New Jersey was catalogued 
by two reports issued in 1968-the Kerner Commission Report, assembled by 
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders convened by President 
Lyndon Johnson in response to the nationwide stream of riots between 196s 
and 1967, and the Report for Action, the lengthy commentary issued by the 
Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorder in the State of New Jersey. 
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The Kerner Commission spent a great deal of time studying the situations in 
Detroit and New Jersey-sites of two of the worst outbursts of urban disorder.11 
In both the federal and state reports, concerns were expressed about tensions 
between largely white police departments and residents of black communities, 
poor housing conditions, the impact of urban renewal and highway construc-
tion programs, unemployment, dysfunctional schools, poo~ health care, and the 
widespread perceptions that courts operated arbitrarily and unfairly. 
Anyone living and working in New Jersey in the late 1960s knew that major 
portions of the state were in deep trouble. Both politicians and courts sensed 
a need for urgent action. Whether that sense of urgency emerged fro;n fears 
about additional racial disorders or heartfelt desires to begin solving deep 
social wounds made little difference. There was both a local and a national con-
sensus that something had to be done. For a brief historical moment, major 
legislative reforms were adopted and courts took risks by joining the efforts. 
Congress adopted Civil Rights Acts in 1964, 1965, and 1968.12 The Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity was created in 1964 as part of President Johnson's War on 
Poverty.13 Among many community-based initiatives, that agency developed the 
still-extant Head Start and national legal services programs. 
The Judicial Response 
Given the distressing events occurring across the nation and in New Jersey, as 
well as the growing restiveness and voting power of black citizens, it is easy to 
understand why those sitting on the New Jersey Supreme Court felt there was 
an urgent need to grapple with some of the issues within their control. They 
certainly sensed that "rebellion" was brewing outside, that one of the commonly 
articulated reasons for the riots in Newark and elsewhere in the state was the 
perception among black and poor people that judicial forums they frequented 
were unfair, and that reforms in some areas were long overdue.14 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court then had a well-deserved reputation for initiating major reforms 
in noncriminal legal doctrine ,15 and the justices sitting on the court in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, as a group, were generally open to arguments for chang-
ing existing law.16 • 
When presented with an opportunity to decide two landlord-tenant cases 
shortly after Martin Luther King's assassination, the court moved forward with 
its law reform agenda. On May 14, 1968, only forty days after King's death, the 
justices agreed to review the appellate division decision in a commercial lease 
dispute-Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper. Arguments were heard on November 18, 
and the decision was rendered the following year on March 17, 1969.17 The Reste 
dispute, though not directly about the ability of residential tenants to raise 
defenses when landlords sought their eviction for nonpayment of rent, still 
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provided the court with an opportunity to weaken or remove a series of old 
legal obstacles to reforming landlord-tenant courts. 
About six months after Reste was decided, the court, aware that Marini v. Ire-
land was pending in the appellate division, certified the case on its own motion 
for immediate review. That action was unusual and spoke volumes about the 
court's determination to deal with landlord-tenant issues. Arguments were 
heard in short order on February 16, 1970, and the decision was issued only 
three months later-on May 18, 1970-while the Gibson mayoral campaign was 
gearing up.18 
Preexisting Eviction Law 
Why did landlord-tenant law become such a focus of attention for both those 
agitating in the streets of Newark and those sitting on the New Jersey Supreme 
Court? The state of the legal doctrine just before the justices heard arguments 
in Reste was horribly outmoded. Its impact-deeply felt in impoverished urban 
communities all across the nation-is best described by another tale. While in 
law school, I went to visit the landlord-tenant court in Chicago as P!lrt of a 1967 
summer internship working with a tenants' union on the near north side of the 
city. I watched the long call of cases at the beginning of the court day. Most of 
the calls went unanswered by tenants, leading to the issuance of default judg-
ments for landlords. · 
When cases finally began to be called for "hearings" wher-c tenants had 
shown up, they were handled in ·remarkably rapid fashion. The cases of a single 
landlord were called in sequence so that lawyers representing different land-
lords would not have to constantly shuffle back and forth to the dais. Before 
the landlords' lawyers could say anything, the judge usually asked the tenants, 
"Have you paid the rent?" The answer generally was no. Without waiting for an 
explanation, the judge would say, "Judgment for possession for [name of the 
landlord]. Call the next case." In short, tenants were summarily evicted for not 
paying rent no matter what the circumstances. 
One particularly poignant case has stuck in my mind for these _last forty-five 
years. I wrote about it in a 2007 article. 
The cases were being called by the clerk when an elderly, thin, white 
woman rose from her seat in response to hearing her name. Her gait 
was quite slow-stooped over and supported bya wooden cane. She was 
dressed in a frilly, long white dress and a white hat with a veil. It struck 
me that she had picked out her finest clothes to wear that morning. 
Perhaps her generation thought it appropriate to dress up for a court 
appearance-like going to church. But this was no church. When she 
was about half way to the front of the court-even before she passed 
the bar-the judge impatiently asked, "Have you paid the rent?" She 
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looked up at him as best she could and began softly speaking. "No, 
but. ... " She was cut off in mid-sentence by the court curtly saying, 
"Judgment for landlord. Call the next case." The woman continued to 
slowly approach the bench, raising her right hand-her left still rest-
ing on the cane-as if she was trying to get the judge's attention. The 
room became unusually quiet. Her apparent desire to continue talking 
· was stopped by the judge who without a hint of emotion leaned for-
ward and said, "Ma'am, your case has been decided. You can go now." 
Crestfallen, she slowly turned and with small, careful steps, worked her 
way toward the rear of the room. The next case was called and decided , 
before she reached the courtroom door. A few tenants watched her 
sadly. Attention to her quickly faded as additional cases were called 
and quickly disposed of. I was stunned. I often wonder what happened 
to her. Where did she go?19 
What sort of theater was I watching? This was a courtroom where only one bit of 
information was deemed important-whether the rent had been paid. No other 
aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship were allowed to disturb the march 
of "justice." The Chicago result was callous at best, but the court followed the 
existing "law" to the letter-just as New Jersey courts did for decades in deciding 
cases in exactly the same fashion. Two sets of legal rules combined to produce 
these results-one dealing with the substantive nature of a lease and the other 
with the procedures used to evict residential tenants. The combination pro-
duced tribunals that urban tenants viewed as blatantly favorable to landlords 
and devoid of sympathy for the plight of even the most impoverished tenants 
residing in deplorable conditions. 
The early substantive law of land leases arose in largely agricultural set-
tings. In return for virtually unchecked authority to use land, a tenant agreed to 
pay rent, to maintain the land, and to return it in its original condition to the 
owner when the lease expired. In those days, the most important asset leased 
was usually the land itself. Requiring the tenant to maintain it was probably 
sensible. As a result, English law provided for an "action in waste"-an action 
by the true owner for damage to the property or to its value occurring during 
possession by a nonowner like a ~enant,20 a position absorbed into New Jersey's 
statutes in 1795.21 If, during the nineteenth century, a tenant destroyed a barn 
or cut down all the timber (rather than just the amount needed to cook or keep 
warm) on a parcel of land, the landlord could recover damages. 
As New Jersey began to industrialize, the old rules were applied to com-
mercial tenants without much thought about whether changing circumstances 
should lead to changes in the rules. In Moore v. Townshend, the first leasehold 
repair case decided by New Jersey's highest court, a landlord claimed that a 
glassworks factory tenant failed to maintain the facilities, including the molds 
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and tools which came with it. 22 The tenant was required to pay $550 to the land-
lord in damages. 
This rule of waste law worked in tandem with limitations imposed by 
nineteenth-century contract law and civil procedure rules. Traditionally, con-
tract claims were limited to those arising from a single covenant or contrac-
tual provision. Defendants could raise only defenses specifically related to that 
claim. What we now know as a counterclaim-the right to respond to a lawsuit 
by filing another one back against the plaintiff-was barred. If a landlord sued 
a tenant for the rent, the tenant could not defend by arguing that the landlord 
had breached a promise to maintain the premises. Such a claim could only be 
resolved in a separate case brought for that purpose. The claims by landlord and 
tenant were independent of one another. 
This is demonstrated well by the early twentieth century case of Stewart v. 
Childs Co.23 Childs Company agreed to lease a building from Stewart for a res-
taurant and a "steam apparatus that perfects the coffee" in the basement. The 
twenty-year term began in 1902. The lease agreement contained express cov-
enants providing that the tenant would pay the $3,000 yearly rent when it fell 
due and that the landlord would "at all times during the said lease keep the 
said cellar waterproof at his own expense." The basement turned out not to 
be waterproof. The landlord did not make repairs or install adequate puIJ?.p-
ing equipment. As a consequence, Childs Company abandoned the premises 
in 1909, and the landlord sued ~or rent. The court ruled that th'e covenant to 
pay rent and the covenant to keep the basement dry were independent, that 
"breach of the covenant to keep the cellar waterproof was not a defense to an 
action for rent," and that the tenant had to pay the rent when it fell due despite 
the fact that the landlord violated the terms of the lease. 
The Childs Company attempted to defend the action for rent not only by 
claiming that the dry basement covenant and the covenant to pay rent were 
interdependent, but also that Childs had been "constructively evicted" from the 
premises. Constructive eviction excused a tenant from the obligation to pay 
rent when the landlord failed to deliver possession to the tenant or took actions 
that deprived the tenant of all ability to use the premises. Even though a ten-
ant's promise to pay rent was independent of virtually all the landlord's prom-
ises in a lease, a landlord still was obligated to leave the tenant in undisturbed 
possession for the full term of the lease. That minimal level of mutuality was 
required in order to prevent landlords from renting property, kicking tenants 
out, and suing them for the rent. 
Even though Childs Company was not able to operate its coffee equipment 
or store goods in the basement, the court refused to find that it was construc-
tively evicted. "We are unable to find," the court wrote, "any evidence that shows 
that the landlord . . . did anything with the intention of depriving the tenant of 
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the enjoyment of the premises." The tenant's right to possession of the building 
was not disturbed. The tenant, after all, was free to arrange for the water to be 
pumped out of the basement! While the lessee was free to file another case in 
contract alleging breach of the dry basement covenant, the rent had to be paid 
in the meantime. 24 
The final piece of the nineteenth-century legal structure was put in place in 
1847 when New Jersey adopted a statute permitting the summary dispossession 
of nonpaying tenants. As towns and cities grew, pockets of poverty emerged, 
transiency became more common, and migration to western areas of the nation 
increased, and landlords began to complain about their inability to arrange for 
speedy transitions from one tenant to another. Ejectment, the traditional claim 
for possession of land, was slow, cumbersome, and laden with requirements 
that sometimes protected tenants. 25 The same issues had arisen in New York 
earlier in the century, resulting in adoption of "summary dispossess" legislation 
in 1820.26 The New York statute became the model for New Jersey twenty-seven 
years later. A provision barring all appeals from summary actions was tossed in 
for good measure. 27 
As a result, New Jersey tenants not only were barred by substantive contract 
rules from raising virtually all contractual defenses or filing any counterclaims to 
suits seeking payment of overdue rent, but they also could be removed quickly if 
they failed to pay. Those tenants with valid claims were forced to either continue 
paying rent while they pursued their claims or cede possession and pursue their 
issues later. In general, summary dispossess courts required quick responses by 
tenants, barred use of counterclaims, and allowed removal of tenants in as little 
as a month. The lack of legal assistance for poor urban tenants made it virtu-
ally impossible to mount a sustained judicial challenge to those practices or to 
lobby legislatures for change. As a result, nineteenth-century eviction practices 
remained intact until the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Reste and Marini. 
There is no need to put a polite gloss on the situation. Landlord-tenant courts in 
Newark and every other large city in the nation were ugly places. My experience 
watching that elderly woman walk out of the courtroom in Chicago symbolized 
the anguish of the era-a sometimes seething anger in minority and poor com-
munities at the unwillingness of people in positions of authority to see unfair-
ness even when it was literally staring them in the face. 
Intervention of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
Reste Realty v. Cooper was a surprising vehicle for the initiation of reforms in 
New Jersey's residential landlord-tenant law. It was, after all, a commercial case. 
After the landlord's oral promise to repair a leal<. allowing rainwater to seep into 
the rented space went unfulfilled, the tenant moved out. On its face, it was a 
simple constructive eviction dispute-one the court could easily have decided 
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for the tenant without much ado. But the justices saw a chance to make some 
pronouncements and, given the historical circumstances, took it. The court's 
resolution of the litigation, a suit for rent against a tenant forced to relocate her 
business because of rainwater leaking into the lower level of Reste's building, 
led to. two important changes. 
First, the court concluded that a lease was a modern contract, with its cov-
enants and clauses part of a unified legal instrument structuring a relationship 
between two people or entities. The residue of the old independent covenant 
idea was washed away. Second, the test for constructive eviction was substan-
tially eased. Rather than requiring tenants to show that they were permanently 
deprived of possession by actions of the landlord, the court ruled that tenants 
only had to show a material breach of the leasehold contract or some substan-
tial interference with their right to possess the premises. 
Highlighting the three kinds of legal verbiage used in the opinion makes 
it easier to understand how extraordinary the court's results were. The first 
change in the old constructive eviction requirement that a tenant be "perma-
nently deprived of possession" involved property-law talk about the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment-the boilerplate clause in every lease guaranteeing that a ten-
ant's property right to possession will not be disturbed by the landlord during 
the term of the lease. The second form of verbiage about "material breach" was 
contract-law talk and took explicit advantage of the contract law .r.oncept favor-
ing interdependence of the various clauses of a lease. The third form of verbiage 
about "substantial interference with possession" was tort-law talk and placed 
duties of care on landlords. Put more simply, the cou·rt pulled ideas from an 
array of legal areas in its effort to modify preexisting rules. It suggests strongly 
that the justices were searching for all available tools to support their landlord-
tenant law reform efforts. 
Putting these ideas together, the tenant Cooper was allowed to use the 
breach of the landlord's express promise to fix the water seepage problems as a 
defense to the action for rent. She no longer had to file an indepen~ent action in 
another court. She was able to claim that the breach so substantially interfered 
with her possessory interest that she could either claim constructive eviction or 
the right to cancel the lease contract because of a material breach. And she was 
able to invoke the landlord's violation of its express duty of repair to justify her 
decision to leave the premises. Along the way, the court also made liberal use 
of exceptions to the parole evidence rule barring use of oral promises to modify 
written agreements and the statute of frauds requiring that leases longer than a 
year must be in writing to allow the tenant to use the landlord's oral promise to 
repair for her benefit.28 In reaching these conclusions, however, the court issued 
a stream of dicta-statements in opinions not necessary to the decision. Rather 
than deciding the case using the simplest and most traditional constructive 
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eviction formula, the justices went out of their way to make pronouncements 
reforming landlord-tenant law and signaling to the property bar that, as Bob 
Dylan sang in 1964, "The times they are a-changin'." 
The case actually involved two successive leases. The water leakage prob-
lems emerged during the first lease. When Cooper's business grew and she 
w9:nted more space she negotiated a new lease agreement for a larger space. 
During negotiations for the second lease, the landlord orally promised to fix 
the water seepage problems that had arisen during the first lease term. Most 
of the dicta arose from the court's handling of the first lease. Before the lanp-
lord made the express oral promise to fix the water problems, Cooper had 
signed the first lease acknowledging that she had inspected the premises and 
promised to carry the burden of making repairs. The court first wrote a long 
paragraph outlining the skimpy learning on tenant remedies in the courts and 
law reviews around the nation. 29 It then noted that the source of the water 
problems in the driveway that ran alongside the building was not in an area 
controlled by the tenant and that she therefore had no duty to malce repairs. 
The driveway was a common area under the control of the landlord. The court 
went on to note that, even if the water problems were in the area leased by 
Cooper, she still did not have to make repairs. State law, the court asserted, 
had long since placed the repair burden for such major defects on the landlord, 
especially when the defect was not discoverable or known by the tenant before 
moving in. In essence a repair warranty for latent defects was implied. 
I must add that it is not at all clear that any of the statutes cited by the court 
as authority for placing the repair obligation on the landlord-generally housing 
and building codes-operated to impose tort duties of maintenance on com-
mercial landlords for spaces inside rented areas. That, of course, seemed not 
to bother the court. In addition, all of this discussion about the first lease and, 
most importantly, the language about implied warranties, was totally unneces-
sary to the result. It involved Cooper's status under the first lease, which was 
not even in effect at the time Cooper left the premises. All the court had to do 
was decide that Cooper was constructively evicted. Everything else was dicta. 
The justices clearly went out of their way in this commercial case to write about 
issues they knew were percolating in residential landlord-tenant law-the area 
most disturbing to New Jersey's urban residents. 30 
Reste, therefore, was a wild opinion. The court threw everything at the prob-
lem it could. Property talk gave way to both contract and tort talk, intermingled 
in ways that are often impossible to untangle. Bargained-for duties of repair, 
like the landlord's oral promise, were treated as interchangeable with tortlike 
duties to repair. The court went out of its way to alter rules, create written con-
tract clauses where none existed, enforce implied agreements that might not 
have been made, create tort duties where none were necessary to resolve the 
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dispute, and pay attention to all that anger and disorder welling up outside the 
courthouse doors. 
When all was said and done, the structure of suits for unpaid rent was dra-
matically altered. Combining the substantive legal changes enunciated in Reste 
with the sea change in civil procedure that had occurred in New Jersey since the 
nineteenth century, tenants became free to file defenses and counterclaims to 
actions for rent just as defendants raised such issues in other sorts of cases. But 
none of this touched summary dispossess court-the court dealing with actions 
for possession for nonpayment of rent rather than suits for unpaid rent against 
tenants who left before the end of their terms. The substantive rules of leases 
and suits for rent were changed, but the summary dispossess court statutes 
were not at issue in Reste. That, of course, was the much more difficult problem 
taken up in Marini. 
Marini v. Ireland 
As noted, the New Jersey summary dispossess statute at issue in Marini origi-
nally barred appeals from summary dispossess decisions. When New Jersey 
overhauled its civil procedure statutes and rules in 1951 to adopt many of the 
same reforms introduced by adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938, the summary dispossess s{atute was amended to allow appeal on issues 
of jurisdiction while continuing to bar all other higher court reviews. Anyone 
who has sat through Civil Procedure in the first year of law school knows that, if 
a plaintiff makes a colorable claim for relief, the court has jurisdiction to hear 
the matter. There may be defenses to the claim, but that does not disturb the 
right of the court to entertain the underlying dispute. The rule is that a com-
plaint well pleaded by a plaintiff provides jurisdiction. It doesn't guarantee a 
victory, but it does guarantee a hearing. So, if appeal under the summary dis-
possess statute was available only on matters of "jurisdiction"-on the power 
of a court to hear a case-the traditional understanding of that ·term barred 
appellate courts from reviewing disputes over sufficiency of the evidence, the 
availability of various defenses, or the underlying structure of substantive law. 
In short, if the New Jersey Supreme Court was to hear the Marini dispute, it had 
to do a hatchet job on the well-pleaded complaint rule and the meaning of the 
word "jurisdiction." And that is exactly what the court did. 
The case arose in a happenstance manner. Gordon Lewis, a legal services law-
yer, was in landlord-tenant court in Camden one day with his usual load of cases. 
Alice Ireland was there, trying without much success to explain her problems 
with a toilet. Lewis went up to her and asked if he could help. She said yes, and 
the rest, as they say, is history. The fact that a lawyer working for tenants was even 
present represented a major shift in legal culture from a just a decade earlier. 
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Some form of legal services for the poor had been around for a while, usu-
ally in the form of volunteer services or offices funded with donations from 
lawyers and other generous souls. But these services and offices were usually 
small and overwhelmed. The Ford Foundation was the first major organization 
to display a deep interest in legal services for the poor. It 
1
funded some experi-
mental programs in the early 1960s, including both offices with attorneys serv-
ing only the needy and law school clinical education programs. A major part of 
President Johnson's War on Poverty was the creation of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) in 1964. It was an amazing agency, empowered to give grants 
for community organizing and other local projects to help the poor. The goverp.-
ment actually gave out money to groups of people pursuing complaints against 
local, state, and federal agencies. 
Funding legal services programs was one of the first, most important and 
(other than Head Start) only long-lasting effort of OEO. In the same year OEO 
was established, Jean and Edgar Cahn published a seminal law review article 
advocating the establishment of a nationally funded legal services program. 31 
The Cahns were friends of Sargent Shriver, who had been appointed by Presi-
dent Johnson to run OEO. Their influence on Shriver's decision to begin fund-
ing legal services offices was critical. A large-scale grant program began in 1965. 
This infusion of funds allowed new legal services offices to open all over the 
country in the late 1960s, including the office where Gordon Lewis worked.32 
Ireland gave Lewis a copy of the summons and complaint in her summary 
dispossess action, along with a plumber's bill and a cancelled check. Shortly 
after she moved into 503B Rand Street in Camden in the spring of 1969, she 
noticed that her toilet was leaking. After the landlord did not respond to 
repeated requests for repairs, Ireland hired a plumber and paid the $85.72 repair 
bill herself. When her July rent came due, she sent the landlord a copy of the bill, 
along with a check for $9.28 to cover the difference between her rent and the 
cost of the repair. Marini cashed the check but demanded that the remainder of 
the rent be paid in cash. Ireland refused and was sued for possession on. July 23. 
When the case was tried, the trial judge concluded that there was no 
authority for "giving the right to tenant to engage plumber and have repairs 
made, then deduct amt. from rent. "33 The tenant appealed and obtained a stay 
of the eviction from the appellate division of the superior court. Pending resolu-
tion of the appeal, Ireland was orde~ed to pay Marini her monthly rent, except 
for the month in question. The New Jersey Supreme Court took the unusual 
step of certifying the case to itself for resolution before the appellate division 
could hear the case. It also stayed, pending review, the judgment for possession 
entered against her. 
Several arguments were made on behalf of Alice Ireland in the appeal. 34 
First, the claim was made that N.J.S. §2A:18-59-the section of the summary 
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dispossess statute limiting appeal to matters of jurisdiction-violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The fol-
lowing section, N.J.S. §2A:18-60, allowed cases "of sufficient importance" to be 
transferred to the regular superior court, from which standard appeals were 
available. The contention was that this difference in treatment was arbitrary 
and made unfair distinctions between tenants. 
Second, Ireland's side argued that, if the statute were valid, there was no 
difference between jurisdiction and the merits of a case. If the tenant had a 
defense that was denied, that decision on the merits raised jurisdictional 
issues. And, finally, Ireland's lawyers asserted that Reste and other develop-
ments required the court to allow tenants to raise repair-and-deduct defenses 
in actions brought for possession because of nonpayment of rent. 
Gordon Lewis signed the brief for Ireland in the high court, but he was too 
busy to do much of the writing. Ken Meiser, a VISTA legal services attorney, and 
Joe Ippolito, then a third-year law student at Rutgers University School of Law 
in Camden, composed it. 35 Years later, Ippolito nostalgically recalled working on 
the case while he was a clinic student.36 He was admitted to the bar just before the 
case was argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court. As a nice gesture, a motion 
was made at the beginning of the oral argument in Marini to add Ippolito's name 
to the brief as an authpr. The court granted the motion immediately.37 
So what did the court do with the Marini case? N.J.S. §2A:18-53 prpvided 
that a landlord could obtain possession where a tenant "shall hold over after 
a default in the payment of rer'it, pursuant to the agreement under which the 
premises are held." As is quite clear from the Marin( complaint, the landlord 
alleged all the necessary aspects of such a claim: ownership by the landlord, pos-
session under a valid lease, and default in the payment of rent. There really was 
no question that, using standard meanings of legal terms, the Camden County 
District Court had jurisdiction over the dispute. Under the summary dispossess 
statute, appeal should have been barred. 
But the court allowed the appeal. Whether rent was in default, Justice 
Haneman opined, raised questions about both jurisdiction and the merits. 
"Whatever," he wrote, '"jurisdiction' means in other settings, _here it uniquely 
connotes the existence of one of the factual situations delineated in N.J.S. 
§2A:18-53. It follows that a finding, by the judge, that there is a default as 
alleged by the landlord, does not dispose of the meritorious issue alone. It as 
well disposes of the jurisdictional issue. "38 Since the merits and jurisdiction 
merged under this logic, the tenant could appeal the merits. Quick and nifty-
but surely this was totally out of sync with both the original purposes of the 
summary dispossess proceeding and the standard well-pleaded complaint rule 
used to evaluate the sufficiency of complaints ever since the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 and largely adopted in New Jersey 
38 RICHARD H. CHUSED 
in the 1950s. The court, by merging jurisdictional allegations and proof of the 
merits, ignored the difference between the burden of pleading facts sufficient 
to provide a court with jurisdiction and the burden of proving facts sufficient 
to win a case once the court takes it. Presumably, the pressing social issues fac-
ing the court after the assassination of Martin Luther I~ing Jr. and the dismal 
situation in New Jersey's urban areas led the court both to take the case away 
from the appellate division on its own motion and to render a result virtually 
unheard of in the annals of civil procedure courses everywhere. 
After the court found it could entertain the appeal, it performed a second 
major reconstruction of the meaning of N.J.S. §2A:r8-53 by holding that a default 
in the payment of rent occurred only if the rent was "owing." Under the old rules 
any unpaid rent was owing, period. Once the statute was construed this way, the 
court was free to rerun the reasoning of Reste, imply a warranty obligating the 
landlord to maintain the apartment according to the requirements of health 
and safety regulations, and find in favor of the tenant. By doing so, the court not 
only altered the old nineteenth-century notion that the conveyance of a period 
of possession in return for the payment of rent was a contract independent from 
the obligation to mal<.e repairs, it also took the critical step of moving the now 
interdependent covenants-including the implied warranty to maintain the 
premises-of a lease into summary dispossess court by allowing tenants to raise 
defenses to eviction actions. 
Today we would ask whether such a major and arguably incoherent recon-
struction of prior law was justified by the need for social reform. Why not wait 
for legislative action? In 1970, however, few doubted the wisdom of the court's 
actions. The justices felt compelled to act, and most of us attuned to the travails 
of landlord-tenant court at the time gave them a standing ovation for doing so. 
Conclusion 
The same extraordinary actions occurred elsewhere. As I noted in my Javins arti-
cle, Judge Skelley Wright wrote an historically inaccurate but compelling opin-
ion justifying the use of an implied warranty of habitability in Washington, D.C. 
And as I have written in another.connection, the Illinois Supreme Court recon-
structed the meaning of its summary dispossess statutes for the same reasons 
at almost the same moment. Other state courts behaved in a similar fashion. In 
short, the judicial creation of the implied warranty of habitability in landlord-
tenant courts all over the country between 1968 and 1973 resulted from a wide-
spread sense that elderly women in veils should no longer be seen struggling out 
of hearings bearing on their frail shoulders the weight of virtually uncontestable 
judgments of eviction for nonpayment of rent. 
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Did all of this legal reconstruction do any good? It certainly left most peo-
ple with a sense that it was possible to obtain some justice in landlord-tenant 
courts. Landlords declining to repair apartments now run the risk of getting 
tied up in litigation and losing actions for possession for nonpayment of rent. 
Fairness actually does break out from time to time. That certainly is worth a 
significant round of applause. But, as a practical matter, little has changed for 
most impoverished residential tenants. The few tenants who manage to obtain 
legal assistance and happen to be living in substandard apartments may be bet-
ter off. But the low budgets for legal services programs mean that the vast bulk 
of tenants still do not receive legal help. Many fail to show up for hearings, have 
no defenses to their evictions, or lack the ability to raise available issues pro se. 
Most judges do not actively assist in raising defenses on behalf of unrepresented 
tenants. Settlement agreements between landlords and tenants calling for the 
continued payment of the regular rent plus installments on the arrears are rou-
tinely approved in most places without much inquiry. 
The grotesque unfairness of 1968 has been replaced by a less charged ver-
sion of the same scenario. Despite the na:ive hope of many in my generation 
that providing defenses in landlord-tenant court .would help large numbers of 
tenants and improve the quality of low-cost housing, most studies find that has 
not happened. 39 The reasons, I thinl<., are clear. The notion that private prol')erty 
owners can afford to provide good-quality housing for poor people is untenable. 
If we want to house all of our fellow citizens in acceptable quarters, we as a soci-
ety must be willing to foot the bill. Historically, we have been unwilling to do it. 
Until we change that tune, all of us will continue to ~onfront daily evidence of 
our culture's miserliness in the faces of the homeless and poor. 
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